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Is the OECD/G20 BEPS Initiative Heading in 
the Right Direction? Some Forgotten (and 
Uncomfortable) Questions
This article critically analyses the scope of the 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) initiative and further raises some 
questions concerning the role played by certain 
long-standing paradigms underlying corporate 
income taxation in the BEPS phenomenon.
1.  The OECD/G20 BEPS Report:
Acknowledgement of a Problem and the
OECD’s Well-Intentioned Intervention
The severe economic and financial crisis has filled the 
newspapers with headlines proclaiming that multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) were not contributing suffi-
ciently to the public revenues of the countries in which 
they were allegedly obtaining their profits. Beyond the 
evidence that these MNEs were subject to surprisingly 
low tax rates (a phenomenon whose causes are varied 
and complex), the studies revealed a growing disjunction 
between the places where the MNEs were carrying on 
their activities and the places where they were ultimately 
reporting their profits for tax purposes.1 
In this context, the G20 mandated the OECD to lead the 
project known today as the Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
ing (BEPS) initiative. A description of the concept of “base 
erosion and profit shifting” was followed by the promulga-
tion of the two key objectives that the initiative wished to 
pursue. The first objective was the elimination of double 
taxation without giving rise to double non-taxation 
opportunities;2 the second and primary objective was to 
provide domestic and international instruments “aiming 
at better aligning rights to tax with real economic activ-
ity”.3 Moreover, the OECD outlined the three pillars that 
* Tax lecturer and PhD researcher, Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid. The author can be contacted at eva.escribano@uc3m.
es. Some of the views presented in this article were first covered 
in depth in the author’s thesis. This research was conducted
during a stay at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public 
Finance and is integrated within the Research and Development 
(R&D) Project DER2013-47912-P (“Rethinking the Structure
and Concepts of International Tax Law”) of the Spanish Min-
istry of Economy and Competitiveness. The author wishes to
thank Prof. J. Zornoza for his valuable comments.
1. A. Ting, iTax – Apple’s International Tax Structure and the Double
Non-Taxation Issue, Brit. Tax Rev. 1, p. 45 (2014) demonstrated this phe-
nomenon using the example of Apple and concluded that the Apple
group had transferred its taxable profits to territories in which its eco-
nomic activities were insignificant, while, at the same time, fully com-
plying with the laws of the countries involved.
2. OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting – Report, p. 53
(OECD 2013), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD
[hereinafter: the BEPS Report]. 
3. Id., at p. 51.
were supposed to enlighten the path it was about to under-
take: (1) the replacement of a competition-based paradigm 
by a collaborative-based one; (2) the importance of taking 
a holistic approach rather than ad hoc measures; and (3) 
the commitment to seek imaginative and ambitious solu-
tions without abandoning pragmatism.4 
2.  The OECD/G20 BEPS Action Plan: Building a
New Framework on Recycled Measures and a
Few Prejudices
The monumental task entrusted to the OECD inevitably 
became trickier when the time came to identify the causes 
contributing to the BEPS phenomenon and further delin-
eate the scope of the Action Plan to counteract it. In the 
author's point of view, the Action Plan5 committed two 
mistakes that thwarted the opportunity to engage in the 
first genuine revision of the principles and rules of inter-
national taxation, whose origins date back to the early 
20th century.
Firstly, the point of departure could be no other than an 
upfront acknowledgment that a clear crisis of rules had 
arisen. While the initial report on BEPS seemed to share 
this view,6 the Action Plan somehow deviated from this 
approach. Without ignoring the imperative need to revise 
the rules, the Action Plan redirected its focus to the tax-
payers once again to hold them accountable for what was 
happening.7 As a result of this, the document made an 
inaccurate and certainly inappropriate use of certain 
legal terms as “artificiality” or “abuse”,8 while referring to 
vague expressions such as “aggressive tax planning”9 that 
4. Id., at pp. 60-62, from which these guidelines may be inferred. All of 
these were welcomed in Y. Brauner, What the BEPS, 16 Fla. Tax Rev. 2,
p. 58 (2014). 
5. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting- Report (OECD
2013), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD [hereinafter: 
the Action Plan].
6. OECD, BEPS Report, supra n. 2, at p. 5, where it is stated that: “While
there clearly is a tax compliance aspect, as shown by a number of high
profile cases, there is a more fundamental policy issue: the interna-
tional common principles drawn from national experiences to share tax 
jurisdiction may not have kept pace with the changing business envi-
ronment”. In the same vein, see id, at p. 28, which reads: “Beyond cases
of illegal abuses, which are the exception rather than the rule, MNEs
engaged in BEPS comply with the legal requirements of the countries 
involved”.
7. This is at least what the author infers from the reading of Actions 6
(prevent treaty abuse), 7 (prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status)
and 12 (require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning
arrangements) of OECD, Action Plan, supra n. 5.
8. For instance, the consideration of the behaviour set out in Action 7 as
“artificial” is, to say the least, debatable.
9. An undefined expression that is commonly present in the various
reports on the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative.
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are devoid of any legal basis. In short, the Action Plan gave 
the impression that it sought to raise the standard required 
of the taxpayer from mere compliance with the letter and 
spirit of the laws to some sort of “exemplary” behaviour 
that would satisfy some sense of justice or morality.10 The 
author believes that this approach is unfortunate and 
prone to generate severe problems from a legal certainty 
perspective.
Secondly, a truly genuine revision of the international tax 
legal framework needs to be conducted necessarily without 
any prejudices. Even though the BEPS Report promised to 
deliver an innovative, ambitious and holistic approach, it 
was soon discovered with disappointment that the Action 
Plan had pushed out of the negotiations a few principles of 
notorious importance. In the first place, the discussion on 
the distribution of tax jurisdiction between residence and 
source was dismissed. Instead, the Action Plan chose not 
to question the residence-source relationship or the tradi-
tional configuration of these principles, confining itself to 
“restore” taxation at both levels.11 Similarly, the discussion 
on the separate tax treatment of entities belonging to the 
same group (the “separate entity approach”), together with 
the standard that has traditionally served as a corrective to 
counteract the profit shifting risks that arise in these sce-
narios (the arm’s length standard)12 was equally rejected.
A deeper analysis of the Action Plan and its outcomes 
reveals a two-speed project. On the one hand, some 
Actions give rise to an awkward sense of déjà vu, as they 
seem to merely dust off old OECD reports for the occa-
sion.13 This is, for example, the case with Actions 2,14 5,15 
10. Inasmuch as OECD, Action Plan, supra n. 5, intends to attribute some 
form of legal repercussions to the behaviours covered by the expression
“aggressive tax planning”, it appears to be demanding that taxpayers 
structure their business operations in such a way that the subsequent 
tax liabilities result in a proper contribution to the public expenditure 
of the countries involved.
11. OECD, Action Plan, supra n. 5, at p. 11, where it is stated that: “While
actions to address BEPS will restore both source and residence taxation 
in a number of cases … these actions are not directly aimed at changing
the existing international standards on the allocation of taxing rights 
on cross-border income”. Action 1 was the only exception to this rule 
(see section 3.5.). 
12. Id., at p. 14, which reads: “There is consensus among governments that
moving to a system of formulary apportionment of profits is not a viable
way forward; it is also unclear that the behavioural changes companies 
might adopt in response to the use of a formula would lead to investment 
decisions that are more efficient and tax-neutral than under a separate 
entity approach”. In fact, Actions 8 to 10 were specifically intended to 
update the interpretation of the arm’s length standard.
13. Brauner, supra n. 4, at p. 60, was not mistaken when he warned against
the potential risk that a tight two-year deadline could result in the
OECD resorting to the ad hoc measures that had been proposed in
previous reports.
14. OECD, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Part-
nerships (OECD 1999), International Organizations’ Documentation 
IBFD; OECD, Corporate Loss Utilization through Aggressive Tax Plan-
ning (OECD 2011); and OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax
Policy and Compliance Issues (OECD 2012), International Organiza-
tions’ Documentation IBFD.
15. OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD
1998).
6,16 717 and 12.18 Conclusive evidence that the OECD/G20 
BEPS initiative has retrieved old measures to address 
the challenges identified in the BEPS Report is the fact 
that virtually all amendments that will be introduced in 
the post-BEPS OECD Model19 are based on pre-existing 
Commentaries to the OECD Model20 which, in turn, are 
the result of old OECD reports. This is particularly the 
case with regard to the proposed changes to articles 1.2 
(application of a tax treaty to entities that are regarded 
as transparent for tax purposes),21 1.3 (saving clause in 
favour of the residence state),22 4.3 (tie-breaker rule for 
determining the residence for treaty purposes of dual-res-
ident persons other than individuals),23 5.4 (anti-fragmen-
tation provision),24 5.5 (refinement of the agency perma-
nent establishment (PE) to address its loopholes),25 10.2 
(the need to retain the ownership of shares for a certain 
period of time to be entitled to reduced withholding tax),26 
13.4 (extension of the concept of shares)27 and X (limita-
tion on benefits (LOB) rule).28 All these measures share an 
evident anti-avoidance character, thereby corroborating 
the position held above.
Conversely, the author observes a small group of Actions 
that did provide the “out of the box” thinking promised 
in the BEPS Report in the form of a few innovative stan-
dards with a global reach. This is particularly the case 
with Actions 1, 13 and 15. Action 1 called into question 
one of the classic pillars of international taxation (the PE) 
in light of the challenges posed by the digital economy.29 
For its part, Action 13 was a response to a long-stand-
ing initiative promoted by non-governmental organiza-
16. OECD, Double Taxation and the Use of Conduit Companies (OECD
1986), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD; OECD,
Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits (OECD 2003); OECD, Tax
Treaty Issues Related to REITs (OECD 2008); and OECD, The Granting 
of Treaty Benefits with respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehi-
cles(OECD 2010), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
17. OECD, Issues Arising under Article 5 (Permanent Establishment) of the
Model Tax Convention (OECD 2002), International Organizations’
Documentation IBFD.
18. OECD, Tackling Aggressive Tax Planning through Improved Transpar-
ency and Disclosure (OECD 2011) and OECD, Co-Operative Compliance: 
A Framework from Enhanced Relationship to Co-Operative Compliance
(OECD 2013).
19. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (26 July 2014),
Models IBFD. 
20. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentaries 
(26 July 2014), Models IBFD.
21. Para. 5 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2014). Revised by
Action 2.
22. Paras. 6.1 and 23 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2014) and
para. 14 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 7 (2014). Revised by
Action 6.
23. Para. 24.1 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 4 (2014). Revised by
Action 6.
24. Para. 27.1 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 5 (2014). Revised by
Action 7.
25. Id., at para. 32.1. Revised by Action 7.
26. Paras. 16 and 17 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 10 (2014). Revised 
by Action 6.
27. Para. 28.5 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 13 (2014). Revised by
Action 6.
28. Para. 20 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2014). Revised by
Action 6.
29. Despite its apparent novelty, the OECD had published a few reports on
the subject. See, for example, OECD, Taxation and Electronic Commerce: 
Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions (OECD 2001) 
and OECD, E-commerce: Transfer Pricing and Business Profits Taxation 
(OECD 2005), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD.
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tions (NGOs) for decades, i.e. country-by-country (CbC) 
reporting. CbC reporting aimed at providing a compre-
hensive overview of the presence of MNEs throughout the 
world, segregating the information (e.g. economic activi-
ties, taxable profits or taxes paid) by jurisdiction. Finally, 
Action 15 aimed at making a leap towards a multilateral 
forum in which all jurisdictions sharing the concerns 
expressed in the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative are equally 
welcome to participate on an equal footing.
Notwithstanding the good impression generated by these 
last three Actions, it can be concluded that the BEPS 
Action Plan has failed to meet the expectations created 
by the BEPS Report for all the reasons stated above. The 
author suspects that the reasons behind this shift have 
little to do with lack of vision or incompetence but rather 
relate to a growing disinterest among the sponsors of the 
OECD/G20 BEPS initiative (i.e. the governments of the 
OECD and G20 member countries) that did not dare to 
undertake what could have been a genuine substantial 
revision of a system forged in the early 20th century.30 
3.  The Appropriateness of Raising Questions 
That Far Exceed the Scope of the BEPS Action 
Plan 
3.1.  Introductory remarks
As anticipated in section 2., the BEPS Action Plan omitted 
a number of questions of a more fundamental nature. As 
a result, there have been multiple debates running in par-
allel to the development of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative 
that have called into question some of the long-standing 
paradigms that the OECD regarded as untouchable. Such 
discussions have not only taken place in academic fora, 
but also within international organizations other than 
the OECD.
The author now proceeds to raise a few questions (see sec-
tions 3.2. to 3.6.) which, in her opinion, deserve greater 
consideration.
3.2.  Should income continue to be taxed at the level of 
the companies?
This is the most fundamental question of all and, thus, the 
first one that ought to be addressed. As taxing the income 
in the hands of the companies has proven to be so trou-
blesome, would it not make sense to abolish corporate 
income taxation and instead tax income in the hands of 
the individuals behind the company?
Companies are nothing more than fictions created by the 
law, which, in turn, confers on them a legal personality 
analogous to that enjoyed by natural persons. This is a 
status that entails the capacity to hold both rights and obli-
gations. The origin of companies goes back to the Indus-
trial Revolution, and their historical purpose was no other 
30. The reactionary attitude of countries, such as the United States, to the 
measures proposed by the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative is well known. 
In this context, L. Sheppard, International Changes the United States 
Shouldn’t Have Made, 76 Tax Notes Intl. 7, p. 563 (2014), describes the 
US stance on base erosion and profit shifting as a “polite pretense of 
participation with quiet undermining”.
than to serve as investment vehicles that protected inves-
tors by way of a limitation on their potential liabilities 
in the event of losses.31 At this point, jurisdictions chose 
to extend their income taxes to these new legal subjects, 
most probably driven by inertia rather than a clear policy 
purpose.
That said, the decision to tax the income in the hands of 
the company has always been controversial. It is rare to 
find an economist who supports the existence of corpo-
rate income taxes (hereinafter CITs),32 and quite a few tax 
experts have similarly criticized them. Some of the prob-
lems posed by CITs will now be brief ly highlighted. 
In general, all taxes tend to be inefficient, discourage 
economic activity and lead to distortions in the deci-
sion-making process of taxpayers. Naturally, CITs are no 
exception to this rule. In particular, CITs are likely to con-
dition decisions concerning the choice of business sector, 
the organizational form (the incorporation decision), the 
location of the activities, the company’s capital structure 
(debt:equity ratio), the dividend policy, etc.33 In addition, 
it is no secret that CITs often generate such a large amount 
of costs and such a high degree of legal uncertainty with 
regard to the ultimate tax implications of the business 
decisions that they may dissuade potential investors or 
entrepreneurs from investing, initiating, maintaining or 
expanding a business activity.
CITs could be forgiven for the problems stemming from 
their implementation to the extent it could be concluded 
that their advantages effectively offset their drawbacks. In 
this regard, there is a widespread assumption that CITs are 
inherently fair, insofar as they contribute to redistributing 
wealth from the companies (symbols of wealth and power) 
to the less privileged social classes.34 However, multiple 
studies have dispelled this myth, concluding that CITs do 
not necessarily help to redistribute wealth in the way they 
are expected to do.
For a better understanding of how redistribution works in 
corporate income taxation, the first question that arises 
is who is affected by the payment of these taxes. Even 
though companies are the nominal taxable subjects of 
the tax, as they are mere legal fictions, they are not the 
ones ultimately bearing the tax burden. Rather, it is those 
individuals who are tangentially linked to the companies 
that do. The next question that arises is which individ-
uals are affected by the payment of the CITs, as compa-
nies make such payments with funds that would other-
wise have served other purposes. Empirical studies have 
concluded that CITs are ultimately borne by three differ-
31. For more on the historical origin of companies, see P.A. Harris, Corpo-
rate/Shareholder Income Taxation and Allocating Taxing Rights between 
Countries: A Comparison of Imputation Systems pp. 40-41 (IBFD 1996).
32. See, for example, the position adopted by the Nobel Prize-winning pro-
fessor of economics William Spencer Vickrey in W. Vickrey, The Cor-
porate Income Tax and How to Get Rid of It, in Retrospectives on Public 
Finance (L. Eden, ed., Duke U. Press 1991).
33. R. Bird, Why Tax Corporations?, 56 Bull Intl. Fiscal Docn. 5, sec. 1. 
(2002), Journals IBFD.
34. Bird, supra n. 33, at sec. 1.2. and Y. Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply 
to New Corporate Income Tax Advocacy, 4. Michigan State L. Rev. 1, p. 
592 (2008).
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ent groups of individuals: (1) shareholders (as a result of a 
decrease in their invested capital);35 (2) employees (by way 
of a reduction in their pay);36 and (3) consumers (through 
an increase in prices).37 In particular, globalization may 
have aggravated the burden for the less mobile individu-
als, i.e. employees.38 
This revelation calls into question the wealth redistribu-
tive role supposedly played by CITs, as the tax revenues do 
not appear to f low from the “prosperous powerful" cor-
porations, but rather from their shareholders, clients and, 
primarily, employees. At this point, it should be noted that 
most tax systems already subject to tax the ability to pay 
expressed by these groups of individuals, generally both 
directly and indirectly.39 As a result, it seems that wealth 
redistribution systems of jurisdictions with CITs in place 
tend to penalize unjustifiably these groups of individu-
als, as they are compelled to contribute to their national 
budget by means of a considerable number of tax instru-
ments, CITs among them. 
What is more, if we regarded those who ultimately bear 
the burden of CITs as the true taxpayers, it could hardly 
be argued that these CITs are consistent with the abili-
ty-to-pay principle. The reason is that the calculation of 
the tax liability in CITs tends to rely solely on the amount 
of net profits obtained by the company during the tax 
period concerned, irrespective of the particular ability to 
pay of the individuals (whether shareholders, clients or 
employees) who are deemed to bear the tax burden at the 
end of the day. Accordingly, such tax burden would fall 
equally on all these individuals regardless of their eco-
nomic positions.
In conclusion, it would be easier to accept the aforemen-
tioned pernicious effects of CITs insofar as they could be 
regarded as effective wealth redistribution tools. 
However, if this myth is dismissed, it appears to be diffi-
cult to maintain the usefulness of these taxes. This also 
appears to be particularly ironic in the context of the 
OECD/G20 BEPS initiative, as the discourse of the media, 
the NGOs and the OECD itself has revolved around the 
notions of equity, wealth redistribution and paying a “fair 
share”.40 
35. A.C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. Polit-
ical Econ. 3, pp. 215-240 (1962), recently reviewed by A.J. Auerbach, 
Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, 20 Tax Policy 
& Econ., p. 33 (2006).
36. W. Arulampalam, M. Deveraux & G. Maffini, The Direct Incidence of 
Corporate Income Tax on Wages, Working Paper 09/2007 (Oxford U. 
Ctr. Bus. Taxn.).
37. M. Krzyzaniak & R.A. Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation Income 
Tax (Johns Hopkins U. Press (1963).
38. H. Grubert & J. Mutti, The Taxation of Capital Income in an Open 
Economy: The Importance of Resident-Nonresident Tax Treatment, 27 
J. Pub. Econ. 3, pp. 291-309 (1985).
39. Generally by means of direct taxes (e.g. personal income taxes) or indir-
ect taxes (e.g. value-added taxes).
40. There are multiple references to the principle of fairness in the BEPS 
Report. See OECD, BEPS Report, supra n. 2, at pp. 37, 48, 49 and 50. See 
also R. Russo & P. Saint-Amans, OECD: What the BEPS Are We Talking 
About?, 70 Tax Notes Intl. 4, pp. 339-340 (2013) and The BEPS Package: 
Promise Kept, 70 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4, secs. 1. and 4. (2016), Journals IBFD.
For these reasons, some have recently pleaded for the 
abolishment of CITs and their replacement by a mecha-
nism that would turn the company into a mere withhold-
ing agent responsible for the collection of the income tax 
imposed on the individual shareholders.41 In other words, 
this would be a tax transparency system preventing tax 
deferral with regard to the income accumulated by com-
panies. Such a system presents major challenges, one of 
them being the identification of the individual sharehold-
ers behind the corporate veil. Nowadays, information on 
the ownership of companies is rarely public, although the 
OECD intends to make some progress in this regard, as it 
recently stated that one of its next priorities is to “address 
the question of beneficial ownership (…) identify the 
natural persons behind the companies, trusts and other 
arrangements".42 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the abolishment of 
CITs is currently an unattainable chimera. This is mainly 
because the citizenship (and by extension its political rep-
resentatives) feel that such taxes are both useful and fair, 
no matter how much these assumptions are based on 
unfounded intuitions.43 Consequently, in leaving aside the 
preservation of CITs, the author now poses some addi-
tional questions regarding the fundamental pillars on 
which they are based (see sections 3.3. to 3.6.).
3.3.  Is it reasonable to insist on the separate entity 
approach in a globalized world?
Assuming that CIT is maintained, the second question 
that arises is who should be regarded as its taxpayer. 
Nowadays, each company is typically treated as a sepa-
rate taxable subject, irrespective of its membership of a 
functionally integrated corporate group, while its taxable 
base is usually calculated on the basis of its accounts. This 
approach poses evident profit shifting risks that tend to be 
corrected by means of the arm’s length principle, which 
adjusts the conditions agreed in intra-group transactions 
so that the taxable base of the company concerned includes 
the profits that it would have obtained if the transaction 
had been carried out with an unrelated party.
In past decades, many parties have raised objections to 
these paradigms, pleading instead for a formulary system 
that regards the MNE as a sole taxpayer, consolidating its 
profits and distributing them among the different group 
entities for tax purposes using a pre-established formula.44 
The reasons are varied but quite convincing. 
The main argument stems from the very raison d’être of 
MNEs. While they comprise a network of separate compa-
41. Brauner, supra n. 34, at pp. 635-636.
42. OECD, Tax Transparency 2016: Report on Progress, Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, p. 5 
(OECD 2016).
43. Bird, supra n. 33 and Brauner, supra n. 34, at pp. 593 and 635. In contrast, 
other scholars still advocate for the maintenance of corporate income 
taxes. See, for example, R.S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the 
State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 5, pp. 1193-1255 
(2004).
44. See, for example, R.S. Avi-Yonah & K.A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate 
Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Appor-
tionment, The Hamilton Project Discussion Papers (2007).
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nies and branches, in practice they all work as components 
of a single gear subject to common control. The possibil-
ity of internalizing business processes rather than relying 
on third parties proves to be more efficient and cost effec-
tive from both an organizational and economic perspec-
tive,45 as it helps to reduce the costs resulting from market 
inefficiencies, such as the operating costs or risks relating 
to the trust in the counterparty (e.g. quality control or 
the protection of sensitive information).46 Furthermore, 
by internalizing business processes, MNEs can achieve 
economies of scale and thus generate synergies that ulti-
mately result in greater profits than those that could have 
been obtained in the market. Such profits would naturally 
fall outside the scope of the arm’s length principle, as they 
would have never occurred under market conditions.47 As 
a consequence, the consolidation of all profits obtained 
by the group for tax purposes appears to align better with 
the economic and organizational reality of the group.48 
The second argument relates to the huge administrative 
burden and compliance costs that the application of the 
arm’s length principle involves. The system consumes 
a disproportionate amount of both public49 and private 
resources, as it has created from scratch a huge industry of 
lawyers, accountants and economists who assist MNEs in 
complying with the arm's length standard.50 At this point, 
it should be noted that nearly 60% of the transactions 
carried out globally are intra-group51 and thus subject to 
the application of this standard. The inherent complexity 
of this system undoubtedly favours those who are better 
equipped in terms of resources, resulting in a two-speed 
system, divided between those who have such resources 
(MNEs supported by large firms) and those who do not 
(small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and tax 
administrations in developing countries).52 
Alternatives to this widespread approach have made 
their way into the legislation of some countries in recent 
decades. Some jurisdictions have included tax consoli-
dation regimes in their domestic legislations,53 although 
45. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 16, pp. 386-405 (1937).
46. M.F. de Wilde, Sharing the Pie: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market 
pp. 162-163 (Rotterdam Erasmus U. 2015).
47. L.E. Schoueri, Arm’s Length: Beyond the Guidelines of the OECD, 69 Bull. 
Intl. Taxn. 12, sec. 5.3. (2015), Journals IBFD.
48. S. Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for The Internal Market, IBFD Doc-
toral Series No. 17 p. 178 (IBFD 2009), Online Books IBFD.
49. It has been estimated that the costs of transfer pricing disputes in United 
States are three to seven times higher than the costs of implementing 
a domestic formulary apportionment regime. See D.R. Bucks & M. 
Mazerov, The State Solution to the Federal Government’s International 
Transfer Pricing Problem, 46 Natl. Tax J. 3, pp. 385-392 (1993).
50. Y. Brauner, Formula Based Transfer Pricing, 42 Intertax 10, p. 627 (2014), 
who states that: “the transfer pricing regime has created from scratch 
a large, economically wasteful industry which exists only to serve the 
need to supply these particular valuations”. 
51. J. Owens, Should the Arm’s Length Principle Retire?, 12 Intl. Transfer 
Pricing J. 3, secs. 1.-5. (2005), Journals IBFD.
52. Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra n. 44, at p. 15 and OECD, Two-Part Report 
to G20: Developing Working Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income 
Countries (OECD 2014).
53. Y. Masui, General Report, in Group Taxation, International Fiscal Asso-
ciation (IFA) Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. 89b, secs. 2.1.1.1. 
and 2.1.1.2 (Sdu Fiscale & Financiële Uitgevers 2004), Online Books 
IBFD, according to whom, of the 30 surveyed countries, 20 had a con-
solidation regime and most of the remaining were inclined to consider 
its implementation.
their scope is almost invariably limited to resident entit-
ies belonging to the group or, at most, the PEs of non-resi-
dent companies that are located within the territory of the 
jurisdiction concerned.54 Federal states, such as Canada 
and the United States, not only consolidate the profits of 
their groups, but also apply formulas to distribute them 
among the different regions where the group carries out 
its economic activities. However, initiatives regarding tax 
consolidation and apportionment have rarely crossed the 
frontier of the jurisdiction concerned. The only attempt 
in this regard was led by the European Union in 2011 with 
its proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB) (see section 3.6.). 
For its part, the OECD has chosen to remain faithful to 
both the separate-entity approach and its widespread cor-
rective, the arm’s length principle, thus corroborating its 
historical opposition to abandoning or even question-
ing these paradigms. However, the OECD did implicitly 
admit that the achievement of the BEPS mantra (i.e. the 
alignment between taxing rights and economic activity) 
necessarily required going beyond the arm’s length stan-
dard55 and moving closer to formulary measures. This 
may be inferred from the final report on the Actions 
concerning transfer pricing, as the OECD resolutely pro-
moted profit split over the remaining methods (particu-
larly in the context of intangibles). This method resem-
bles formulary apportionment to a certain extent, as it 
aggregates all the profits derived from a transaction to 
subsequently distribute them among the entities that have 
presumably contributed to generate the profits.56 In sce-
narios involving intangible assets, BEPS opts for attrib-
uting the profit to the group entities that have performed 
the most important functions related to the intangible, 
i.e. development, enhancement, maintenance, protection 
and exploitation.57 
3.4.  Must corporate tax residence tests be revisited?
Departing from the preservation of CIT and the con-
sideration of each entity belonging to a group as a sepa-
rate taxable subject, the author now proceeds to call into 
question another paradigm that has been, intentionally 
or inadvertently, left outside the scope of the BEPS Action 
Plan.
Jurisdictions must define the conditions under which a 
taxpayer will “reside” for tax purposes in their territory 
and consequently be subject to an unlimited tax liabil-
54. Id., at sec. 3.2.4., i.e. only Denmark, France and Italy have extended their 
regimes to include non-resident entities.
55. OECD, Action Plan, supra n. 5, at p. 20.
56. Schoueri, supra n. 47, secs. 2.5.2. and 2.5.3. There are two substantial 
differences between formulary apportionment and the profit split 
method. First, while the formula consolidates the global profit real-
ized by the group, profit split only aggregates the result of a particu-
lar transaction. Second, while formula apportionment distributes the 
profit using factors predetermined in a rule, profit split uses the criteria 
that would have presumably been adopted by independent parties. 
57. OECD, Actions 8-10 Final Report 2015 – Aligning Transfer Pricing Out-
comes with Value Creation (OECD 2015), International Organizations’ 
Documentation IBFD. 
254 BUllETIN FOR INTERNATIONAl TAxATION May 2017 © IBFD
Eva Escribano
ity on its worldwide income.58 In the case of individuals, 
they have the ability to reside in a given location, which 
may be deduced from the analysis of visible facts, such as 
their physical presence or their personal or economic ties 
to the country concerned. In this context, tax residence 
rules tend to rely on some of these factors. Conversely, it 
is not in the nature of companies to reside in any given 
place. As a consequence, jurisdictions have no alternative 
other than to resort to artificial criteria whose fulfilment 
results in deeming the entity a resident therein. 
The most common criteria used by jurisdictions to confer 
corporate residence for tax purposes may be classified into 
four different groups:59 (1) formal tests (e.g. place of incor-
poration, legal seat or registered office); (2) tests that rely 
on the place where the company is run (e.g. place of effec-
tive management or central management and control); (3) 
tests that refer to the place where the company carries on 
its economic activity; and (4) tests that refer to the res-
idence of its shareholders. The comparative study con-
ducted by the OECD on the corporate residence tests used 
in 53 jurisdictions60 reveals that 85% employ test (1) and 
77% use test (2), while only 4% and 2% opt for tests (3) and 
(4), respectively. In any case, the vast majority of jurisdic-
tions have two tests in place, typically a combination of 
tests (1) and (2).
To date, tax treaties have never interfered in the way in 
which jurisdictions confer tax residence status on their 
companies, so this matter has traditionally been left to 
the sole discretion of the sovereign state.61 For their part, 
tax treaties have confined themselves to the resolution 
of double residence issues, i.e. situations where the same 
taxpayer is regarded as tax resident in both contracting 
states. This determination is decisive to the extent trea-
ties depart from the assumption that only one of the con-
tracting states acts as the “residence state”. While the BEPS 
Action Plan does not alter this status quo,62 it does provide 
58. Beyond notable exceptions, such as Costa Rica and as France, which 
have a territorial tax system and, therefore, tax residence is, a priori, 
irrelevant.
59. L. De Broe, Corporate Tax Residence in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in Resi-
dence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law (G. Maisto ed., IBFD 
2009), Online Books IBFD.
60. OECD, Rules Governing Tax Residence (OECD), available at www.oecd.
org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/tax- 
residency/ (accessed 18 Nov. 2016).
61. This is true in the three most inf luential models, i.e. the OECD Model 
(2014), UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries (1 Jan. 2011), Models IBFD and US Model Tax Con-
vention on Income (17 Feb. 2016), Models IBFD. In fact, paragraph 4 of 
the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 4 (2014) confirms this posi-
tion, where it is stated that: “conventions for the avoidance of double 
taxation do not normally concern themselves with the domestic laws 
of the Contracting States laying down the conditions under which a 
person is to be treated fiscally as ‘resident’ and, consequently, is fully 
liable to tax in that State. They do not lay down standards which the pro-
visions of the domestic laws on “residence” have to fulfil in order that 
claims for full tax liability can be accepted between the Contracting 
States. In this respect the States take their stand entirely on the domes-
tic laws.”
62. Beyond the proposal to amend article 4(3) of the OECD Model (2014) 
and to replace the tie-breaker rule, i.e. the POEM, with a remission to a 
mutual agreement procedure (MAP). See OECD, Action 6 Final Report 
2015 – Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Cir-
cumstances pp. 72-75 (OECD 2015), International Organizations’ Doc-
umentation IBFD.
a rule that is tangentially related to the domestic defini-
tion of corporate tax residence.
The OECD Model (2014) makes the application of a tax 
treaty conditional on the fulfilment of two requirements: 
(1) a person must be regarded as tax resident in at least one 
of the contracting states (articles 1 and 4); and (2) a person 
must be subject to a tax on its income or capital imposed 
by at least one of the contracting states. As noted previ-
ously in this section, the qualification of a person as “tax 
resident” is exclusively determined by the relevant state, 
although the OECD Model (2014) would only respect such 
considerations for the purposes of a tax treaty insofar as 
the resident is liable to full tax liability that goes beyond 
income derived from sources of the residence state. Once 
both conditions are met, a taxpayer would be a priori enti-
tled to the benefits of the treaty.
The OECD/G20 BEPS initiative concluded that the afore-
mentioned requirements were insufficient, as they resulted 
in the granting of treaty benefits in circumstances that 
were regarded as “inappropriate”.63 With this, the OECD 
was alluding to the phenomenon commonly known as 
"treaty shopping", which involves scenarios in which a res-
ident of a third state seeks to gain access to the benefits 
of a tax treaty concluded between two contracting states, 
typically by way of an intermediary entity that complies 
with the conditions established in articles 1 and 4 of the 
OECD Model.
In this context, the Final Report on Action 6 proposed the 
addition of a new article to the OECD Model that would 
effectively help to raise the threshold for treaty entitlement 
by means of an LOB clause (inspired in the US clause) 
and/or a principal purpose test (PPT) rule.64 An LOB 
clause can be broadly defined as a rule that imposes addi-
tional requirements for a resident of a contracting state to 
enjoy treaty benefits.65 What these requirements have in 
common is that they all intend to guarantee that the res-
ident entity is substantially and sufficiently linked to the 
state that grants the status of tax resident, either because 
its shares are regularly traded on a local stock exchange 
or because, inter alia, it actively carries on business activ-
ities within its territory or the majority of its shareholders 
are residents there.
At this point, the question arises as to whether the need to 
resort to certain anti-treaty shopping measures ultimately 
reveals a systemic mistrust towards the criteria that have 
traditionally served to grant the tax resident status. In 
other words, the fact that these criteria are easy to manip-
ulate and do not ensure a genuine connection between the 
company and its residence states makes it necessary to 
resort to anti-treaty shopping measures, as these contrib-
ute to neutralizing such weaknesses. This being so, should 
the OECD consider the possibility of becoming involved 
in this matter? For example, bearing in mind that purely 
formal criteria are more likely to generate problems from 
63. OECD, Action Plan, supra n. 5, at pp. 18-19.
64. OECD, supra n. 62, at pp. 17-69.
65. J.D. Bates et al. Limitation on Benefits Articles in Income Tax Treaties: 
The Current State of Play, 41 Intertax 6/7, p. 395 (2013).
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a treaty shopping perspective,66 should jurisdictions be 
advised against its use? Should article 4.1 of the OECD 
Model reject these as valid criteria for the purposes of a 
tax treaty?
3.5.  Is the update of the PE concept both convenient 
and feasible?
Having analysed the way in which jurisdictions confer the 
resident status on companies in their CITs, the author now 
proceeds to challenge the other side of the coin: the defini-
tion of source.67 Just as the ability to reside in a place was 
not a natural attribute of companies and it was therefore 
necessary to establish a legal convention the satisfaction of 
which resulted in the consideration that a company resides 
in a jurisdiction for tax purposes, a similar problem is 
encountered in determining the source of an item of 
income. As source is not a concept that can be inferred 
from the nature of things,68 the legislator finds himself 
again in the position of drafting a rule that places the 
source of a given item of income in a certain state, which 
in turn may claim the right to tax the income in question. 
Tax treaties have always relied on the same legal conven-
tion when it comes to identifying those cases in which a 
contracting state may tax the business profits realized by 
a resident of the other contracting state.69 This convention 
is the PE in its three forms, i.e. (1) a fixed place of business; 
(2) a construction PE; and (3) a dependent agent PE.70 It 
was then held that the fulfilment of these requirements 
reveals that the non-resident taxpayer is effectively inte-
grated into the economic life in the host state to the extent 
that the latter can legitimately assert its taxing rights over 
the profits that could be attributed to such a PE.71 
Undoubtedly, the PE is the natural consequence of the 
economic context in which it arose, when physical pres-
ence was decisive in conducting any kind of economic 
activity, including the provision of services. In such a sce-
nario, the PE appeared to be the ideal parameter by which 
66. It should be noted that only 17% of the surveyed countries of the com-
parative study (see supra n. 60) only have formal criteria in place.
67. Many of the issues that are discussed further in section 3.5. are covered 
in E. Escribano, An Opportunistic, and yet Appropriate, Revision of the 
Source Threshold by the Twenty-First Century Tax Treaties, 43 Intertax 
1, pp. 6-13 (2015).
68. K. Vogel, Worldwide vs Source Taxation of Income: A Review and 
Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part I), Intertax 8-9, p. 223 (1988).
69. The concept of a PE can already be found in Austria-Hun.-Prussia Tax 
Treaty (1899), which is considered as the first tax treaty ever concluded. 
This tax treaty may have been inspired by the concept of Betriebsstätte 
(fixed establishment) in Prussian legislation. See A. Skaar, Permanent 
Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle p. 72 (Kluwer L. & Taxn. 
1991).
70. All three methods are embodied in article 5 of the OECD Model (2014), 
the UN Model (2011) and the US Model (2016). The UN Model (2011) 
one also includes a “service PE” in article 5(3)(b).
71. Skaar, supra n. 69, at p. 559, who states that: “The conventional wisdom 
is that an enterprise with a foreign PE has extended its activities abroad 
to such a degree that the benefits from this country s´ expenditure net-
works justify taxation in that country”. In the same vein, see paragraph 
11 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 7 (2014), which reads: 
“(it) ref lects the international consensus that, as a general rule, until an 
enterprise of one Estate has a permanent establishment in another State, 
it should not properly be regarded as participating in the economic life 
of that other State to such an extent that the other State should have 
taxing rights on its profits”. 
to measure the degree of participation of a non-resident 
taxpayer in the economic life of the host state. However, 
business models have evolved in a way that the correla-
tion between physical and economic presence has been 
significantly weakened. Advances in transport and com-
munications, the automation of certain functions and the 
popularization of the Internet with the consequent expan-
sion of electronic commerce and the remote provision of 
services are some of the long list of milestones that have 
resulted in the question of whether economic presence 
in a given state should continue to be measured solely by 
means of a parameter entirely based on a physical and 
tangible presence.72 
The OECD/G20 BEPS initiative has devoted two actions 
to the PE concept: one aimed at its enhancement (Action 
7)73 and the other at its rethinking (Action 1).74 The latter 
action endorsed some of the aforementioned concerns75 
and questioned whether the PE concept is still consistent 
with the principles upon which it was originally based, 
particularly considering that non-resident taxpayers are 
increasingly able to become closely involved in the eco-
nomic life of the host state without having a PE there.76 
The Final Report on Action 1 provided three proposals 
aimed at mitigating the inherent limitations of the PE 
concept in a very different economic scenario to that in 
which it originated.77 The first proposal is a nexus of “sig-
nificant economic presence” comprised of various alter-
native tests that represent some of the business strate-
gies adopted by the technological enterprises. The Final 
Report recommends a combination of a revenue-based 
factor together with a second indicator based either on the 
digital presence of the company (through a local domain 
name or digital platform) or the volume of active users 
or data collected.78 The second proposal involves subject-
ing digital transactions to a gross-basis withholding tax at 
source,79 either as an autonomous measure or as a collect-
ing mechanism that facilitates the enforcement of the first 
proposal. Finally, the third alternative entails the adop-
tion of an “equalization levy” aimed at ensuring equal 
treatment of resident and non-resident suppliers. India 
72. Escribano, supra n. 67, at pp. 8-9.
73. OECD, Action 7 Final Report 2015 – Preventing the Artificial Avoidance 
of Permanent Establishment Status (OECD 2015), International Orga-
nizations’ Documentation IBFD.
74. OECD: Action 1 Final Report 2015 – Addressing the Tax Challenges of 
the Digital Economy (OECD 2015), International Organizations’ Doc-
umentation IBFD.
75. Id., at pp. 79 and 100, which literally recognize that a non-resident 
company can today interact with customers in a state remotely through 
a website or a mobile app without maintaining a physical presence in 
the state. It is observed that companies can currently expand their cus-
tomer base in a state with few or no infrastructures and personnel.
76. Id., at p. 101.
77. Id., at pp. 107-117.
78. This test departs from the assumption that the number of users of a plat-
form or the volume of personal and commercial data which companies 
can extract from them constitutes a fundamental asset for technological 
enterprises. This idea was originally advance by the report presented by 
Pierre Collin and Nicolas Colin to the French Ministry of Finance in 
2013, in respect of which it was concluded that the concept of PE should 
be able to ref lect the value provided by the users by means of their data.
79. This draft is partially based on Y. Brauner & A. Baez, Withholding Taxes 
in the Service of BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital 
Economy, IBFD White Papers (IBFD 2015).
256 BUllETIN FOR INTERNATIONAl TAxATION May 2017 © IBFD
Eva Escribano
has already opted for this, although its scope differs from 
that proposed by the OECD.80 
Clearly, the three proposals are still in an embryonic stage, 
as the Final Report on Action 1 does not provide a nor-
mative draft and barely specifies their contents and scope. 
This may be interpreted as a symptom of other far-reach-
ing problems. The first one is the apparent political dis-
interest in a substantial modification of the term.81 The 
second probable obstacle, and perhaps the hardest to over-
come, is the tremendous difficulty in translating a general 
idea of how a PE should be constituted into a legal rule that 
not only serves the intended policy purpose effectively but 
is also manageable, difficult to circumvent and compat-
ible with the current legal framework. The OECD itself 
warned against a number of challenges and risks posed 
by each one of the three proposals,82 giving the impres-
sion that a formula that satisfactorily meets the aforemen-
tioned requirements is far from being agreed.
3.6.  Is the complete reformulation of corporate income 
tax the only way forward?
While the OECD drafted the rules requested by the BEPS 
Action Plan, scholars were working in parallel on new 
normative solutions to counteract base erosion and profit 
shifting risks. A few of these scholars share the feeling 
that CITs involve so many structural problems that resolv-
ing these necessarily requires a substantial reformula-
tion of the relevant policy objectives, founding principles 
and design of the tax. As a result, a number of proposals 
have been advanced, whether completed or ongoing, that 
intend to lay the basis for a true reformulation of CITs. 
This article considers two of them.83 
The first proposal that should be highlighted is the 
CCCTB, a project that suggests group consolidation for 
tax purposes and a subsequent distribution of the profits 
80. The Indian equalization levy came into force on 1 June 2016. A. Mehta, 
“Equalization Levy” Proposal in Indian Finance Bill 2016: Is It Legitimate 
Tax Policy or an Attempt of Treaty Dodging?, 22 Asia-Pac. Tax Bull. 2 
(2016), Journals IBFD analysed the functioning of the levy and its ques-
tionable compatibility with the Indian treaty network.
81. Danielle Rolfes, the US Treasury International Tax Counsel has asserted 
that: “Treasury will not countenance fundamental changes to the per-
manent establishment rules, which other countries clearly want … some 
tweaking of the PE rules may be warranted … any tweaking should not 
take the form of a digital commerce PE”, as quoted in D. Spencer, The 
OECD BEPS Project: Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Part 1), 25 
J. Intl. Taxn. 1, pp. 30-41 (2014).
82. These three proposals have important weaknesses from the perspec-
tive of management, i.e. particularly the revenue-based factor and the 
volume of users and/or data collected of the user-based factor from 
the “significant economic presence” nexus and the withholding tax in 
respect of the difficulties in collecting it, the possibilities for circumven-
tion, i.e. the digital factors test of the “significant economic presence” 
nexus, the generation of undesirable asymmetries, i.e. the withholding 
tax and the equalization levy, and their questionable compatibility with 
the legal framework in place, i.e. the “significant economic presence” 
nexus would require amendment of the attribution rules of the equi-
valent of article 7 of the OECD Model (2014) in the tax treaties, while 
the withholding tax could infringe EU law and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the equalization levy could equally 
violate EU law.
83. Proposals that were identified as appropriate “long-term policy options” 
by the report on taxation of the digital economy of the Commission 
Expert Group, Report of the Commission Expert Group on Taxation of 
the Digital Economy pp. 49-50 (May 2014). 
according to a formula based on sales, labour and assets.84 
The European Union chose to re-initiate this project 
following its initial failure in 2011, although with two 
important novelties.85 This time, the CCCTB is not con-
ceived as an elective regime, at least not for MNEs whose 
global turnover exceeds EUR 750 million a year, as such 
MNEs would be obliged to apply the regime. The second 
difference is that the Commission has proposed a progres-
sively phased implementation. To this end, the first two 
steps (common tax base and consolidation) were put into 
motion in October 2016,86 thus postponing the negotia-
tion on the formula apportionment.87 Beyond the EU pro-
posal, group consolidation and formulary apportionment 
have been (and still are) considered by a large number a 
scholars, who have greatly contributed to highlighting the 
advantages and shortcomings that this innovative regime 
may pose in practice.88 
The second proposal is the destination-based corporate 
tax89 (hereinafter DBCT), which originated within the 
framework of a research project led by the Oxford Univer-
sity Centre for Business Taxation. In essence, the proposal 
was for a replacement of current CITs by the DBCT. Its tax 
base would depart from the company’s cash f low, thereby 
including net financial inf lows and allowing the immedi-
ate expensing of all investment expenditure. It intends to 
tax the corporate profit at destination, which, for the pur-
poses of this regime, will be interpreted as the residence 
of the final customer. The DBCT is clearly inspired by 
value-added taxes, as exports would be tax exempt, while 
imports would be taxed. 
Both proposals entail a substantial departure from the 
paradigms that have been called into question here. In 
the first place, the implementation of the CCCTB would 
imply the abandonment of the separate entity approach 
and the arm’s length standard and, by extension, the erad-
84. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (Com 2011/0058), EU Law IBFD.
85. The initiative took place within the framework of the EU Action Plan 
for a Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation. The differences from the 
2011 project are highlighted in T. Maguire, CCCTB: The Sequel, 28 Irish 
Tax Rev. 3, pp. 107-113 (2015).
86. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Corporate Tax Base (Com 2016) and European Commission, Proposal 
for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(Com 2016). For his part, E. Röder, Proposal for an Enhanced CCTB as 
Alternative to a CCCTB with Formulary Apportionment, 4 World Tax 
J. 2 (2012), Journals IBFD has stated that the European Union should 
only introduce the first phase of this action plan, i.e. the common tax 
base.
87. J. Müller, Why Europe needs 3CTB to Get Ahead (Kluwer Intl. Tax Blog 
2015).
88. T. Albin, International Aspects of the CCCTB in Europe (Océ Business 
Services 2014), which is a PhD thesis that has provided comprehensive 
insight into formulary apportionment from an EU perspective. See also 
C.E. Mclure (Jr), Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm’s 
Length Principle with Formulary Apportionment, 56 Bull. Intl. Fiscal 
Docn. 12 (2002), Journals IBFD; Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra n. 44; 
and A. Ting, Multilateral Formulary Apportionment Model: A Reality 
Check, 25 Austrl. Tax Forum 1, pp. 95-136 (2010).
89. M. Deveraux & R. de la Feria, Designing and Implementing a Destina-
tion-Based Corporate Tax, Working Paper 14/07 (Oxford U. Ctr. Bus. 
Taxn. 2014). This was not, however, the first time that academics have 
argued for such a regime. See, inter alia, R.S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, 
Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harvard 
L. Rev. 7 (2000) and J. Mirrlees et al. eds., Dimensions of Tax Design: the 
Mirrlees Review (Oxford U. Press 2010).
257© IBFD BUllETIN FOR INTERNATIONAl TAxATION May 2017
Is the OECD/G20 BEPS Initiative Heading in the Right Direction? Some Forgotten (and Uncomfortable) Questions
ication of the complications and risks they generate (see 
section 3.3.). For its part, the DBCT would also render 
transfer pricing regulations irrelevant.
Secondly, taxation would no longer arise wherever a 
company is deemed to be located for tax purposes. This 
means that the geographical position of the company 
(i.e. the state in which it is tax resident or where its PE is 
located) would thus cease to determine which state should 
be entitled to tax the company’s profits. This should be 
welcomed as good news, considering the increasing irrel-
evance and inappropriateness of the notions of corporate 
tax residence and PE and the subsequent disadvantages of 
making taxation heavily dependent on them. As stated in 
section 3.4., corporate residence tests are generally mean-
ingless, easy to manipulate and do not ensure a sufficiently 
genuine connection between the taxpayer and the state 
which claims to be the residence state, particularly in the 
case of formal tests. For its part, the PE concept has not 
kept pace with the new business scenario and has thus 
become instrumental in ensuring avoidance of source-
based taxation rather than the opposite.90 
Finally, and most importantly, both regimes would con-
tribute to accomplishing the BEPS mantra (see section 1.). 
Taxation would arise wherever assets are kept, employees 
work, sales are conducted (as in the CCCTB) or where the 
final customer resides (as with the DBCT), so, to the extent 
that it is understood that these are valid indicators of where 
90. Skaar, supra n. 69, at p. 559.
value is generated, it can be concluded that the outcomes 
of both regimes would be better aligned with the ultimate 
policy objectives expressed in the OECD/G20 BEPS initia-
tive. Incidentally, by making taxation dependent on these 
factors, tax planning opportunities would tend to dimin-
ish, as they are generally less susceptible to manipulations.
4.  Conclusions
The measures resulting from the BEPS Action Plan 
will undoubtedly contribute to achieving the two 
objectives set in the BEPS Report: the prevention of 
double non-taxation and the alignment of taxing 
rights with the presence of an economic activity. 
However, doubt will remain as to whether more 
ambitious approaches could and should have been 
taken. Would they have contributed to achieving 
these objectives more satisfactorily and effectively? 
Would political agreement on such approaches have 
been reached? While the answer to the first two 
questions is likely to be positive, the answer to the 
third one is doubtful. Now that the creative phase 
of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative is almost over 
and the implementation phase is underway, it is 
time for academics and international organizations, 
such as the United Nations and European Union, to 
lead the way forward. The question that the author 
leaves readers with is, therefore, this: is it possible to 
abandon prejudices and put forward brave solutions 
that are not only feasible but also likely to result in 
political agreement? 
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